

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ACDE-00 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03

SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

SAM-01 AECE-00 DRC-01 /138 W  
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P R 140805Z JUN 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0113

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

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USNMR SHAPE

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0068

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

3.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP

MEETING OF JUNE 5, 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN ITS JUNE 5 MEETING, THE AD HOC GROUP DISCUSSED JUNE 4 INFORMAL MEETING WITH EAST (MBFR VIENNA 33 AND 34). ALLIED REPS AGREED THAT EASTERN REPS HAD SEEMED SENSITIVE TO ALLIED CHARGES OF LACK OF FLEXIBILITY. EASTERN ACCUSATIONS THAT ALLIED REPS WERE DELIBERATELY IGNORING EASTERN PROPOSALS LED SOME ALLIED REPS TO CONCLUDE THAT EASTERN REPS MAY HAVE BEEN RECEIVING CRITICISM FROM THEIR GOVERNMENTS FOR HAVING ALLOWED INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS TO FOSUC ON WESTERN PROPOSAL. SOME ALLIED REPS NOTED THAT COMMON CEILING APPEARED TO BE THE MAJOR

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PROBLEM FOR THE EAST. NETHERLANDS REP URGED THAT EAST BE

ASKED TO ACCEPT COMMON CEILING TENTATIVELY, LEST CONCEPT BECOME TOO MIRED IN OBJECTIONS FOR LATER USE, BUT US DEP REP NOTED THAT PARTICIPANTS IN INFORMALS HAD AGREED FOR TIME BEING TO RESTRICT DISCUSSION TO WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. GROUP ALSO APPROVED TEXTS (SEPTELS) OF TWO PLENARY STATEMENTS FOR USE ON JUNE 6: A STATEMENT ON PHASING, AND A REPLY (BY US REP) TO SOVIET CRITICISM IN MAY 30 PLENARY OF ALLIED DATA. END SUMMARY.

DISCUSSION OF REPORT OF JUNE 4 INFORMAL MEETING WITH EAST

2. US REP OPENED DISCUSSION OF REPORT OF JUNE 4 INFORMAL (VIENNA 33 AND 34) BY CALLING ATTENTION TO SOVIET REP'S OBVIOUS SENSITIVITY TO ALLIED CHARGE THAT EAST HAD NOT DEMONSTRATED FLEXIBILITY. SOVIET REP APPEARED TO HAVE ANTICIPATED THE CHARGE, SINCE HE HAD REFERRED TO PREPARED NOTES IN ATTEMPTING TO REFUTE IT. US REP THOUGHT THE BEST WESTERN TACTIC IN FUTURE INFORMAL SESSIONS WOULD BE TO CONTINUE TO STRESS ALLIED FLEXIBILITY, AS EVIDENCED BY ALLIED WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS A REVIEW PROCEDURE AND A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT, AND CONTRAST THIS WITH EASTERN ADHERENCE TO PREVIOUS POSITIONS. US REP ALSO ASKED THAT SOVIET REP WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT INFORMALS WERE CONCENTRATING ON WESTERN PROPOSALS AND ALLEGEDLY IGNORING THAT OF THE EAST. IT WAS PROBABLY FOR THIS REASON THAT EASTERN REPS HAD NOT RESPONDED TO ALLIED MENTION OF A POSSIBLE REVIEW PROCEDURE. HOWEVER, LATER THAT DAY, AFTER THE INFORMAL SESSION, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD SHOWN SOME INTEREST IN THE REVIEW PROCEDURE BY ASKING QUESTIONS ABOUT IT AS A SOCIAL OCCASION.

3. UK REP (ROSE), WHO HAD TAKEN PART IN INFORMAL SESSION, SAID HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY LENGTH AND VEHEMENCE OF SOVIET REP'S REACTION TO ALLIED CHARGES OF INFLEXIBILITY AND BY HIS COMPLAINT THAT THERE WAS ONLY ONE PLAN ON THE TABLE FOR DISCUSSION -- THE WESTERN PLAN. SOVIET REP'S VEHEMENCE SHOWED THAT HE WAS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED. UK REP FELT THAT SOVIET REP PROBABLY FEARED HE WAS VULNERABLE TO CHARGES FROM

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HIS OWN AUTHORITIES THAT HE HAD ALLOWED THE ALLIES TO FOCUS DISCUSSION IN RECENT INFORMALS TOO MUCH ON WESTERN PROPOSALS. IT WAS PROBABLY FOR THIS REASON THAT KHESTOV HAD REFUSED TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF NEW ALLIED MATERIAL. AT THE END OF THE INFORMAL SESSION, WHEN ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAD TRIED TO STEER SOVIET REP BACK TO THE POINT THAT THE WEST HAD MADE CONCESSIONS AND THE EAST HAD NOT, KHESTOV HAD NOT RESPONDED.

SOVIET DEP REP (SMIRNOVSKY) DID SHOW SOME INTEREST IN THE REVIEW PROCEDURE, AND IT WAS HE WHO HAD ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT IT AFTER THE INFORMAL SESSION, AT THE ITALIAN RECEPTION. THE UK REP THOUGHT THE EAST WOULD PROBABLY PURSUE THIS SUBJECT IN THE FUTURE.

4. BELGIAN REP (ADRIAENSSEN), WHO HAD ALSO PARTICIPATED IN THE JUNE 4 INFORMAL SESSION, SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN A REVEALING MEETING. THE SOVIET REP SEEMED TO FEEL TRAPPED BY EASTERN COMMITMENT TO DISCUSS QUESTION OF "WHOSE FORCES WILL BE REDUCED FIRST" IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS. AS HE HAD DONE DURING THE PREPARATORY TALKS, SOVIET REP HAD SUGGESTED THAT WHEN NEGOTIATORS ARE FACED WITH TWO IRRECONCILABLE PLANS, THEY SHOULD DRAW MIDDLE LINE BETWEEN THEM AND DRAW ON ELEMENTS OF BOTH. BUT THE EAST APPARENTLY REGARDED THE ALLIED CONCESSIONS AS TOO CLOSELY TIED TO WESTERN PROPOSALS TO REPRESENT MIDDLE GROUND. ADDITIONALLY, GDR REP (OESER) HAD NOTED THAT THE SOURCE OF THE MAIN EASTERN OBJECTION TO THE WESTERN APPROACH WAS THE COMMON CEILING IDEA. THEREFORE, BELGIAN REP CONCLUDED, PERHAPS IT WAS TIME TO DISCUSS WITH THE EAST WHAT THE COMMON CEILING MIGHT INCLUDE, SINCE THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT WAS THE BRIDGE TO WHAT THE EAST REGARDS AS " THE UNKNOWN ISLAND" OF THE SECOND PHASE.

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AECE-00 OMB-01

SAM-01 DRC-01 /155 W

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P R 140805Z JUN 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0114

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INFO USMISSION NATO

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0068

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

5. ITALIAN REP (CAGIATI) SAID GROUP SHOULD TAKE NOTE OF STATEMENT BY POLISH REP (STRULAK) THAT ALLIED NON-INCREASE FORMULA WAS AN INDIRECT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ACCEPT OBLIGATIONS FROM THE BEGINNING. ITALIAN REP THOUGHT THAT STRULAK'S REMARK SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND FOR FUTURE REFERENCE, SO THAT ALLIED REPS WOULD BE IN POSITION TO POINT OUT TO EASTERN REPS THAT THEY HAD ADMITTED THAT ALL WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE ACCEPTING OBLIGATIONS FROM THE BEGINNING WITH A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT. ITALIAN REP ASKED WHAT SOVIET REP HAD MEANT BY CHARGE THAT ALLIED REPS MIGHT BE REPORTING INCORRECTLY TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS ON EASTERN PLAN. US DEP REP REPLIED THAT IT WAS JUST PART OF SOVIET REP'S LECTURE TO ALLIED REPS ON DIPLOMACY,  
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IN WHICH HE HAD CHARGED ALLIES WITH SEEKING TO TRICK EAST INTO DISCUSSING ALLIED PLAN. POSSIBLY HIS AUTHORITIES HAD CHARGED SOVIET REP WITH ALLOWING ALLIES TO TAKE THE BALL AWAY FROM HIM. ALLIED REPS HAD ALSO USED THIS RHETORICAL DEVICE OCCASIONALLY, SUGGESTING TO SOVIET REP THAT HE WAS NOT REPORTING ALLIED PROPOSALS ACCURATELY.

6. ITALIAN REP ALSO THOUGHT SOVIET REP'S STATEMENT THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS REALIZED THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CONTINUE AFTER A FIRST STEP MIGHT BE AN "INVOLUNTARY OPENING." GREEK REP (DOUNTAS) NOTED THAT SOVIET REP HAD RECOGNIZED, TOO, THAT THE NO-INCREASE CLAUSE INCLUDES A COMMITMENT OF ALL PARTICIPANTS FROM THE BEGINNING. PERHAPS THE ALLIES SHOULD ELABORATE ON THIS, HE SUGGESTED.

7. CANADIAN REP (GRANDE) SAID THAT HE HAD HAD SOME APPARENT CONFIRMATION THAT SOVIETS WERE SENSITIVE OVER THEIR LACK OF FLEXIBILITY FROM AN AUSTRIAN OFFICIAL WHO HAD ACCOMPANIED AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR KREISKY TO MOSCOW. RUSSIANS HAD TOLD THIS AUSTRIAN OFFICIAL IN EMPHATIC TERMS THAT IT WAS THE WEST WHICH WAS STALLING IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

8. NETHERLANDS REP (QUARLES) THOUGHT IT WAS EVIDENT FROM REMARKS OF THE POLISH REP (STRULAK) THAT THE EAST WAS DIRECTING ITS TACTICS TOWARD GETTING RID OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. HE FEARED THAT WHEN THE ALLIES SAID TO THE EAST THAT THEY WERE ONLY ASKING EAST TO ACCEPT PROPOSALS ON A TENTATIVE BASIS, AND FAILED TO INSIST THAT THE COMMON CEILING ALSO BE ACCEPTED ON A TENTATIVE BASIS, ALLIES RAN THE RISK OF LOSING THE CONCEPT. LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, COMMON CEILING MIGHT BECOME HEDGED ABOUT WITH SO MANY PROBLEMS AND BE SO STRONGLY OPPOSED BY EAST THAT ALLIES MIGHT BECOME RELUCTANT TO PRESS FOR IT. NETHERLANDS REP ALSO NOTED SOVIET REP'S SUGGESTION THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD SEEK SOME COMMON STEP. IF THIS LINE OF TAKING ONE SMALL STEP TO GET THINGS MOVING WERE PURSUED, ALLIES MIGHT END UP ACCEPTING SYMBOLIC APPROACH AND LOSING THE COMMON CEILING.

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9. FRG RP (BEHREND) AGREED WITH NETHERLANDS REP. MAIN EASTERN PURPOSE IN ADVANCING SYMBOLIC PROPOSAL, SAID FRG REP, WAS TO GET AROUND THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. MONTHS AGO, POLISH REP HAD INDICATED TO FRG REP THAT THE MAIN NEGOTIATING PROBLEM FROM EASTERN POINT OF VIEW WAS HOW TO GET THE COMMON CEILING OUT OF THE WAY. SOVIET REP HAD ARGUED CLEVERLY IN CLAIMING THAT THE EAST HAD SHOWN FLEXIBILITY BY DETACHING ITS SYMBOLIC PROPOSAL FROM THE REST OF THE EASTERN PLAN. ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO SAY THAT THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION IS JUST A CHIP OFF THE BLOCK OF THE MAIN EASTERN PROPOSAL. OBVIOUSLY, SAID FRG REP, SOVIET REP WAS UNEASY OVER HIS AGREEMENT, PRIOR TO THE RECESS, TO DISCUSS WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. DISCUSSIONS IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS HAVE CENTERED ON WESTERN PHASED APPROACH, AND SOVIET REP WANTED TO GET AWAY FROM THAT.

10. BELGIAN REP SUGGESTED THAT SINCE THE COMMON CEILING WAS A STUMBLING BLOCK FOR THE EAST, IT MIGHT HAVE TO BE MADE MORE ATTRACTIVE TO THE EAST. PERHAPS THE AHG SHOULD ASK THE SPC TO THINK ABOUT THIS PROBLEM. THE QUESTION ON POSSIBLY INCLUDING AIR FORCE MANPOWER UNDER THE COMMON CEILING WAS AN EXAMPLE.

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NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

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P R 170805Z JUN 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0115

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INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASS BONN

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0068

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

11. US DEPREP REPLIED THAT AHG HAD ALREADY RAISED QUESTION OF AIR FORCES IN ITS REPORT TO NAC BEFORE EASTER. ALLIES SHOULD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN WHAT THE EAST IS DRIVING AT AND WHAT THE ALLIED RESPONSE TO IT SHOULD BE. THE ALLIES MUST NOT ACCEPT EASTERN EFFORTS TO MAKE THE "COMMON CEILING" A "DIRTY WORD." BUT THEY SHOULD ALSO INSIST THAT EAST ADHERE IN THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS TO THE AGREED SUBJECT. EAST SHOULD BE ASKED TO REFRAIN FROM DISCUSSING THE DETAILS OF THE CONTENT OF REDUCTIONS WHEN DISCUSSING WHOSE FORCES ARE TO BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. THE ALLIES SHOULD OBSERVE THE SAME RULE; SINCE THE COMMON CEILING RELATES TO THE ALLIED REDUCTION PROPOSAL, IT SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WHILE PARTICIPANTS

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WERE STILL SEEKING TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

12. BELGIAN REP REPLIED THAT GROUP HAD INDEED ASKED SPC TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER, BUT SPC EVIDENTLY REGARDED IT AS A LOW PRIORITY ITEM. AD HOC GROUP SHOULD INDICATE THAT THE MATTER HAD SOME URGENCY.

13. NETHERLANDS REP NOTED THAT DISCUSSION IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS HAD OVERFLOWED INTO OTHER SUBJECTS THAT THE AGREED TOPIC; IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE THAT ALLIES COULD GET THE EAST TO AGREE TO A TWO-PHASE CONCEPT WITHOUT DISCUSSION OF THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS -- NAMELY, APPROXIMATE PARITY. BUT THERE WAS NO NECESSITY TO GO INTO DETAILS AT THIS POINT. THE ALLIES COULD NOT BIND THEMSELVES BY RULES WHICH WOULD PREVENT THEM FROM ADVOCATING THEIR MAIN GOAL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

DISCUSSION OF JUNE 6 FRG PLENARY STATEMENT ON PHASING (SEPTAL)

14. AFTER GROUP HAD AGREED TO VARIOUS MINOR EDITORIAL CHANGES IN DRAFT PLENARY STATEMENT ON PHASING, ITALIAN REP SUGGESTED, WITH REFERENCE TO A PASSAGE WHICH NOTED THAT SUBSTANTIAL CANADIAN REDUCTIONS HAVE ALREADY TAKEN PLACE, THAT THESE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE DESCRIBED AS "UNILATERAL" AND "RECENT". UK ACTING REP (FACER) WONDERED WHETHER IT WAS WISE TO IMPLY THAT ANY WESTERN COUNTRY WAS WILLING TO REDUCE UNILATERALLY. ITALIAN REP REPLIED THAT SOME UNILATERAL ACTIONS MAY OCCUR AND THE ALLIES SHOULD NOW LAY GROUNDWORK FOR INCLUDING ANY SUCH UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS, SHOULD THEY OCCUR, IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT. UK ACTING REP AND CANADIAN REP DEMURRED. FRG REP SAID HE WOULD PREFER THAT ALLIES REFER TO THOSE WHO HAVE INCREASED THEIR FORCES RATHER THAN TO THOSE WHO HAVE DECREASED THEM. US DEP REP REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO RAISE THIS SUBJECT. ITALIAN REP RETURNED TO HIS SUGGESTION AND SAID THAT  
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IF THE NEGOTIATIONS EVER HAD AN OUTCOME, IT MIGHT OCCUR AS THE RESULT OF SOME UNILATERAL SOVIET REDUCTION FOLLOWED BY A DEMAND THAT THE ALLIES FOLLOW SUIT. THE ALLIES SHOULD THEREFORE BEGIN NOW TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK

FOR A CLAIM THAT SUCH SOVIET ACTION BELATEDLY FOLLOWED PRIOR UNILATERAL ALLIED REDUCTIONS. GROUP, HOWEVER, REJECTED ITALIAN PROPOSAL TO ADD WORD "UNILATERAL", BUT DID INSERT "RECENT" WITH REGARD TO CANADIAN REDUCTIONS.

15. FRG REP RAISED OBJECTION TO PHRASE REFERRING TO A PROVISION "COMMITTING PARTICIPANTS" TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION, ON GROUNDS THAT SUCH PRECISE LANGUAGE HAD HERETOFORE BEEN USED ONLY IN INFORMALS. GROUP AGREED TO SUBSTITUTE "AGREEMENT ON CONTINUING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND PHASE." AFTER FURTHER MINOR EDITORIAL IMPROVEMENTS, THE DRAFT WAS APPROVED.

DISCUSSION OF US PLENARY RESPONSE TO SOVIET CRITICISM OF ALLIED DATA (SEPTEL)

16. CHAIRMAN OF THE DRAFTING GROUP (GREEK DEPREP NEZERITIS) NOTED THAT THREE ISSUES HAD BEEN RAISED IN DRAFTING GROUP WITH REGARD TO DRAFT REPLY TO SOVIET CRITICISM OF ALLIED DATA: (1) WHETHER TO ANSWER ALL OF SOVIET REP'S ALLEGATIONS IN ONE STATEMENT; (2) WHETHER TO MENTION THE FACT THAT SOVIETS HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN PRIVATELY INFORMED THAT 890,000 FIGURE FOR TOTAL NATO MANPOWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE DRAWN FROM PREPUBLICATION VERSION OF DEFENSE POSTURE STATEMENT WAS A MISPRINT; (3) WHETHER REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO STORED WARSAW PACT TANKS, IN VIEW OF LACK OF AGREED NATO INTELLIGENCE. GROUP AGREED THAT ALL SOVIET POINTS SHOULD BE ANSWERED IN ONE STATEMENT ON JUNE 6, RATHER THAN TWO WEEKS LATER, IN ORDER TO HAVE MAXIMUM EFFECT. GROUP ALSO AGREED THAT COMPLAINT ABOUT SOVIET USE OF A FIGURE WHICH THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN TOLD WAS A MISPRINT WAS BETTER MADE BILATERALLY THAN IN A PLENARY.

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ACTION ACDA-19

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NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20



USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 ISO-00 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

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P R 170805Z JUNE 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0116

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INFO USMISSION NATO

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0068

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

17. NETHERLANDS REP NOTED THAT ONE SOVIET ERROR HAD NOT BEEN ADDRESSED IN THE DRAFT REPLY. SOVIET REP HAD CRITICIZED ALLIED CONCEPT OF DISPARITY OF GROUND FORCES BY SAYING THAT IT WAS BASED ON RANDOMLY SELECTED FIGURES AND THAT THE COMMON CEILING BASED ON THIS CONCEPT OF DISPARITY WAS THEREFORE UNCONVINCING AND GROUNDLESS. ALLIED CONCEPT OF COMMON CEILING, SAID NETHERLANDS REP, IS NOT BASED ON THE PARTICULAR FIGURES UNDER DISCUSSION HERE, WHICH WERE ADVANCED MERELY TO ARRIVE AT A STARTING POINT FROM WHICH TO COMPUTE A COMMON CEILING. THEY ARE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION. IF THE EAST CLAIMS THAT THEY ARE INCORRECT, IT IS UP TO THEM TO PROVIDE BETTER FIGURES. US REP SAID THAT THRUST OF SOVIET CRITICISM WAS ALLIED SELECTION OF GROUND FORCES FOR REDUCTION BECAUSE THAT IS WHERE ALLIES CAN DEMONSTRATE A  
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DISPARITY. THE DRAFT DOES ANSWER THAT POINT AND ALSO MAKES THE POINT THAT IT IS UP TO THE EAST TO PROVIDE FIGURES.

18. FRG REP SAID ALLIES WERE TREADING ON DANGEROUS GROUND BY RELATING DATA TO COMMON CEILING AT THIS POINT, SINCE INTERNAL ALLIED GUIDELINES CALL FOR REDUCTIONS NOT TO EXCEED TEN PERCENT OF ALLIED GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA. FRG REP ADDED THAT TO ADD MATERIAL PROPOSED BY NETHERLANDS REP WOULD BE UNWISE BECAUSE IT MIGHT IMPLY THAT COMMON CEILING WAS AN ADJUSTABLE FIGURE.

19. FRG REP ALSO NOTED THAT PASSAGE IN STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SCHLESINGER QUOTED IN WORKING GROUP DRAFT WAS FOLLOWED BY AN UNQUOTED PASSAGE ON NATO SUPERIORITY IN OTHER RESPECTS WHICH COULD BE THROWN INTO ALLIED FACES BY THE EAST. IF ALLIES STARTED USING QUOTATIONS THEY RAN RISK OF SUPPLYING MORE AMMUNITION TO THE EAST. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WARN EAST REPS THAT, IF THEY PURSUE THIS TACTIC, ALLIES COULD ALSO USE QUOTATIONS AGAINST THEM. OF WHICH THERE WERE AN ABUNDANCE MADE BY WARSAW PACT LEADERS, SUCH AS THE LATEST REMARK BY THE EAST GERMAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE THAT THE WARSAW

PACT HAS SUPERIOR FORCES AND WILL HAVE TO MAINTAIN SUPERIOR FORCES. ITALIAN REP SUGGESTED THAT THIS WARNING BE MADE IN AN INFORMAL CONTEXT, SINCE IT SOUNDED LIKE A THREAT. THIS WAS AGREED.

20. BELGIAN DEPREP (WILLOT) OBJECTED THAT ANY REFERENCE IN DRAFT STATEMENT TO STORED WARSAW PACT TANKS WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPROPER, SINCE GROUP WAS OBLIGED TO USE NATO AGREED DATA, AND NATO INTELLIGENCE HAD NO AGREED FIGURES ON SUCH TANKS. MC REP (CAPTAIN BIELDERS) CONFIRMED THAT THERE WERE NO SUCH NATO AGREED FIGURES. US REP SAID US MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES HAD DISCUSSED PROBLEM WITH BRITISH MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES AND BOTH HAD AGREED THAT NUMBER OF STORED WARSAW PACT TANKS WAS APPROXIMATELY  
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EQUAL TO STORED NATO TANKS. SIPRI PUBLICATION SHOWED STORED TANKS ON BOTH SIDES, HE SAID, ALTHOUGH ITS FIGURES WERE TOO HIGH. US REP SAID HE WOULD PREFER NOT ONLY TO MENTION PACT TANKS IN STORAGE, BUT TO INDICATE THAT THEIR NUMBERS WERE ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT TO THE NUMBER OF NATO TANKS. BELGIAN DEP REP INSISTED ON HIS POINT. FRG REP OBJECTED TO REFERENCE TO MAGNITUDE OF PACT HOLDINGS OF STORED TANKS, IN ABSENCE OF AGREED FIGURES, BUT SAW NO PROBLEM IN MENTIONING THEIR EXISTENCE. SINCE IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT TANKS STORED ON EITHER SIDE WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE REDUCTION BASE, IT WAS THEREFORE IMMATERIAL HOW MANY THERE WERE. BELGIAN REP SAID HIS DELEGATION HAD MADE ITS POINT BUT WOULD DEFER TO THE CONSENSUS TO LEAVE THE PASSAGE AS IT WAS.

21. NEXT AHG MEETING SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 7.  
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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** GROUND FORCES, ALLIANCE, MILITARY PERSONNEL, NEGOTIATIONS, MEETINGS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, EAST WEST MEETINGS, MEETING PROCEEDINGS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 14 JUN 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974MBFRV00068  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** DG ALTERED  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740154-0856  
**From:** MBFR VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 10  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 20 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <20 MAR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <08 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP MEETING OF JUNE 5, 1974  
**TAGS:** PARM, NL, CA, US, UR, NATO, WTO, NAC, MBFR  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005